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We construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and 
Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a 
friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post 
prices at which they are willing to sell their single unit of a good. Buyers then simultaneously 
choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer chooses the 
same seller, the good is randomly sold to one of the buyers. If a seller is not chosen by any 
buyer, his unit is not sold. Our experimental results show a broad consistency with the model of 
Burdett et al. and less support for an alternative model, which is analogous to the model of 
Montgomery (1991), and which has different assumptions on the strategic interaction between 
sellers. The main departures that we observe from the Burdett et al. model are that (a) price 
dispersion exists and is slow to decay, (b) prices exceed the equilibrium level when there are 
only two sellers, and (c) buyers’ purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price 
differences when there are two sellers.  
 
1. Introduction 
The classical model of perfect competition in microeconomics is frictionless in the sense that it 
contains an implicit assumption that buyers and sellers can coordinate so that no buyer who is 
willing to pay more than the market price and no seller with a marginal cost lower than the 
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market price fails to make a trade. This coordination requires that the matching process not 
involve too many or too few buyers trying to purchase from an individual seller. If the matching 
process involves frictions and possible coordination failure, units must be rationed and 
inefficiency can result. Indeed, this type of friction characterizes typical markets where it is 
costly to travel from one seller to another and a buyer cannot observe the number of buyers 
approaching a seller he intends to visit.
1  
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), hereafter BSW, model a market with this type of friction 
in an elegant and general manner. Here, we focus on a special case of their model with the 
following structure. Sellers, who each have one unit of a good for sale, simultaneously post 
prices. Buyers observe prices and then have an opportunity to choose a seller from whom to 
attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer attempts to purchase from the same seller, 
only one of the potential buyers, chosen at random, is able to make the purchase. The other buyer 
receives a payoff of zero. If no buyers visit a seller, the seller is unable to make a sale and also 
receives a payoff of zero. Thus, the principal friction is that buyers must commit themselves to 
the seller from whom they will attempt to purchase before knowing the choices of other buyers. 
Rationing occurs if a seller faces excess demand. Units of sellers whom no buyers choose remain 
unsold. 
In contrast to a frictionless setting in which buyers can always purchase from the low-
priced sellers, the sellers charging the lowest prices are not necessarily those who make the sales 
in equilibrium, since buyers may not all attempt to purchase from the lowest-priced sellers. This 
means that prices do not unravel downward to marginal cost, as would occur under Bertrand 
competition. For buyers there is a tradeoff: they can visit a lower-priced seller and receive a 
larger profit in the event they are able to purchase, or they can visit a higher-priced seller where 
there may be a higher probability of being able to make a purchase. For sellers, a tradeoff exists 
between charging a higher price and receiving a larger profit in the event of a sale and charging a 
lower price to increase the probability of making a sale. As in the Cournot model, sellers face a 
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payoff function that is continuous in their strategy, which is their posted price, rather than the 
discontinuous payoff function that would exist in a Bertrand pricing game with no frictions. 
There is generically a unique symmetric equilibrium to the game, aside from asymmetric 
equilibria that require coordination that would be very difficult in a decentralized economy.
2 The 
symmetric equilibrium has the properties that all sellers charge the same price and each buyer 
visits each seller with equal probability. 
  In the BSW model all agents are strategic actors. Both sides make their decisions to 
maximize profit and there are no restrictions on the division of rents between the two sides of the 
market. An alternative set of assumptions underlies the model of Montgomery (1991), originally 
proposed to describe frictions in the labor market, in which the buyers (employers) post the 
prices (wages). In the analog to his model in which sellers post prices, sellers do not interact 
strategically, but instead behave as price takers who are constrained to ensure that buyers gain a 
minimum reservation level of surplus. Though these assumptions might be viewed as ad hoc, 
they are quite reasonable to those who study experimental markets. Competitive behavior on the 
part of sellers in a market is observed in frictionless market environments under many of the 
institutions of exchange that have been studied in the laboratory even when there are only a small 
number of sellers (Smith, 1982), including duopoly (Alger, 1987) or even monopoly (Smith, 
1981) markets. Substantial evidence also indicates that people are reluctant to accept highly 
unfavorable divisions of surplus (e.g. Güth et al., 1982; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Furthermore, 
treating prices as exogenous to one’s own decisions is a heuristic that is cognitively less 
demanding than reasoning logically through the steps required to calculate the fixed point of two 
or more reaction functions. 
  In this paper we report an experiment that investigates the behavior of a market with 
frictions of the type described above. The structure of the economy and the nature of the friction 
parallel the BSW model, but also allow the Montgomery model to be applied in a straightforward 
manner. There are two treatments in our experiment. In the first treatment, 2seller, there are two 
sellers and three buyers in each market, and in the second treatment, 3seller, three sellers and 
two buyers comprise each market. We compare our data to the predictions of the BSW and the 
Montgomery models, and evaluate the relative accuracy of the two models. Support for the BSW 
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model would indicate that the friction does not induce sufficient complexity, distributional 
consequences, or competitiveness so that a fully strategic model is inconsistent with the data. 
Greater support for the Montgomery model than the BSW model would indicate that one or all of 
these effects may be important enough to outweigh the influence of some strategic 
considerations. Support for either model rather than a model appropriate for a frictionless 
environment would indicate that the existence of the matching friction is an important influence 
on decisions and market outcomes.  
Our choice to study a market with relatively few agents has some implications. It is the 
setting under which the two theoretical models make the most divergent predictions from each 
other, so it is optimal from the point of view of discriminating between theories.
3 The existence 
of a small number of participants also potentially simplifies the calculation of optimal strategies, 
because sellers would have an easier time assessing reaction functions for the strategies of a 
small number of competitors. Furthermore, buyers might find it less demanding cognitively to 
randomize their choice of seller among fewer alternatives. On the other hand, a small market is 
the setting under which the assumption of non-cooperative behavior in the BSW model or of 
competitive behavior in the Montgomery model can most plausibly be called into question. 
Although there is more potential for collusive behavior when a small number of agents are on 
one side of the market, the experiment limits the potential for collusion by randomly re-grouping 
subjects each period in a “strangers” design. The strangers design is intended to approximate 
one-shot conditions and is the appropriate matching protocol to employ when evaluating models 
of one-shot games, but when the environment is sufficiently complex that some experience 
would be required before participants can be expected to fully comprehend the decision situation.  
The results of the experiment show that within individual sessions, prices converge 
towards a common price with decreasing price variance over time. This is consistent with 
convergence toward a symmetric equilibrium. The prices reflect the market pressures that 
underpin both models, but they are generally closer to the predictions of the BSW than the 
Montgomery model. The principal departures from the BSW model are that in the 2seller 
treatment, prices are higher, observed buyer demand is not as sensitive to price differences, 
quantity exchanged is lower, and price dispersion is higher than predicted.  Our results are 
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described in section four, after a brief review of the models and previous experiments in section 
two, and a summary of the experimental design in section three. Our conclusions are summarized 
in section five. 
 
2. The Models and Predictions 
2a. The BSW model 
In the model of BSW there are n buyers and m sellers. Each buyer i has a valuation vi = 1 for 
purchasing a unit of the good. Each seller can sell up to one unit and incurs no cost to do so. The 
game consists of two stages. In the first stage sellers simultaneously choose prices; pj denotes the 
price seller j posts. In the second stage, buyers, after having observed the prices all sellers 
charge, choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase. If no buyers choose a particular seller, 
that seller’s profit is zero. If exactly one buyer chooses seller j, seller j receives a profit of pj and 
the buyer receives profit 1 – pj. If k > 1 buyers choose seller j, the seller makes a profit of pj, and 
one of the k buyers is randomly chosen to purchase the unit. The buyer chosen receives a payoff 
of 1-pj, and the other k-1 buyers receive zero.  
  BSW solve for the generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game that does 
not require coordination, for arbitrary n and m. This symmetric equilibrium has the property that 
all sellers charge the same price and buyers visit each seller with equal probability.
4 This is the 
most plausible equilibrium that might emerge in our experiment, because all sellers as well as all 
buyers are identical in terms of position in the game and objective function. Furthermore, the 
random re-matching in our experiment makes coordination on an asymmetric equilibrium highly 
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4 They also characterize asymmetric equilibria for the n = m = 2 case that involve coordination, in which sellers 
choose unequal prices and buyers approach certain sellers with probability one. These coordinated equilibria may be 
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less plausible in our environment with no non-market communication and randomly rematched subjects. 6 
and each buyer attempts to purchase from each seller with probability 1/m. The expected number 
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2b. The Montgomery model 
Montgomery’s (1991) model of the labor market considers a situation where prospective 
employers post wages simultaneously. This is followed by the choice of employer on the part of 
workers. A version of the model in which the sellers post prices and buyers choose a seller from 
whom to attempt to purchase yields alternative predictions to BSW for the outcomes of the game 
they model. The difference between the two models is that Montgomery assumes a different 
individual rationality constraint than BSW. In BSW’s model, a buyer’s individual rationality 
constraint is that his surplus must be non-negative, that is, U  ≥ 0, and is not binding in 
equilibrium. In contrast, in Montgomery’s model, the seller is required to give the buyer a 
“market” level of surplus. This surplus is equal to the payoff a buyer could receive from going to 
another seller. The individual rationality constraint for buyers is binding in equilibrium. Each 
seller is also acting as a price taker in Montgomery’s model, taking a market price as given, and 
thus is not involved in a strategic interaction with the other sellers. The equilibrium price in the 
Montgomery model is equal to:
 5 
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Although the equilibrium prices differ between the BSW and the Montgomery models, the 
probability of matching is the same since sellers charge the same price and buyers visit each 
seller with equal probability. Therefore, equation (2) also specifies the expected number of sales 
in the Montgomery model. Because of the lower transaction prices in the Montgomery model, 
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arbitrarily close together in large markets. In particular, if b = n/m is fixed, then as m, n → ∞,  PB ,PM → 1 – (b/e
b – 
1). The two models differ in that the BSW model, in contrast to the Montgomery model, allows individual sellers to 
exploit their market power in choosing prices. However, this ability disappears as the market becomes large. 7 
sellers’ expected profits are lower and buyers’ expected payoffs are higher than in the BSW 
model.  
 
2c. Previous experimental research 
Previous laboratory studies of posted offer markets in frictionless environments have 
documented some clear empirical patterns (see chapter 4 of Davis and Holt (1993) for a survey). 
Prices and quantities traded converge to the competitive equilibrium when sellers do not have 
market power. Convergence toward the competitive price usually occurs from above; that is, 
initial prices in experimental sessions tend to be higher than predicted (Plott and Smith, 1978; 
Ketcham et al., 1984). The direction of convergence is independent of the equilibrium surplus 
division between buyers and sellers (Davis and Williams, 1986). If there exist Nash equilibria 
with supercompetitive prices, there is a tendency for prices to converge to levels that exceed the 
competitive equilibrium. Supercompetitive pricing is also more likely with a relatively small 
number of sellers (e.g., Fouraker and Siegel, 1963). Alger (1987) finds that collusive outcomes 
are sometimes attained in experiments with 150 periods, an unusually long time horizon for 
economic experiments when there are two sellers interacting repeatedly, while such outcomes 
occur only about one-third of the time with three sellers. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) 
observe supercompetitive pricing with two sellers (but not with three or four sellers), even when 
sellers are randomly re-grouped each round. Cason and Williams (1990) study a frictionless 
environment that is similar to the current study in that all sellers have constant and equal 
marginal costs and all buyers have constant and equal unit valuations, but with four buyers and 
four sellers. They observe prices that correspond to the competitive level, even though nearly all 
of the surplus accrues to one side of the market in equilibrium. Since our setting is very different 
from the frictionless environment in previous studies it is not clear whether any of these patterns 
would carry over to our experiment. 
Researchers have introduced frictions in laboratory posted offer markets through buyer 
search costs. Abrams et al. (2000) study a posted offer market with search, and include a 
treatment in which equilibrium prices correspond to the monopoly level because buyers obtain 
only one price quote per search (Diamond, 1971). They find that most prices are closer to the 
price range midpoint that splits the exchange surplus than to the predicted level. Davis and Holt 
(1996) obtain similar results. On the other hand, in three of four relevant trial sequences, Grether, 8 
Schwartz and Wilde (1988) observe results closer to the Diamond (1971) extreme in an 
experiment that featured anonymous sellers and public information on the previous period’s 
price distribution. Cason and Friedman (2003) study an environment in which buyer search costs 
lead to equilibrium price dispersion, and observe prices that correspond to the equilibrium price 
range. However, they clearly reject the mixed strategy equilibrium because sellers’ posted prices 
have significant positive autocorrelation and cross sectional correlation. In contrast to this 
previous research on posted offer markets with frictions, the present experiment introduces 
frictions through mismatching and rationing. Buyer search costs play no role. 
 
3. The Experiment 
3a. Procedures 
The four sessions reported in this study were conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental 
Economics Laboratory at Purdue University in the spring of 2002. All 95 subjects were 
undergraduate students at Purdue University recruited from introductory economics courses. No 
subject participated in more than one session of the study. Some subjects had participated in 
earlier economics experiments, but all were inexperienced in the sense that they had never taken 
part in an earlier session of this type. Table 1 outlines the name and date of each session, the 
number of participants, the number of buyers and sellers in each group, and the price predictions 
of the BSW and the Montgomery models. In the 2seller treatment each group consisted of two 
sellers and three buyers, while in the 3seller treatment each group had three sellers and two 
buyers. In both treatments the groups were of size five and there were a minimum of 20 subjects 
in each session. 
    
    [Table  1:  About  Here] 
 
The appendix contains the instructions given to subjects in the 2seller treatment. The 
instructions for the 3seller treatment are identical except for the references to the number of 
buyers and sellers. The experiment was completely computerized other than the experimenter 
reading aloud the instructions after they were handed out to participants. The computer program 
used the z-Tree toolbox developed at the University of Zurich (Fischbacher, 1999). In each 
session there were fifty periods and a random matching rule was in effect. That is, each player 9 
was randomly regrouped with other buyers and sellers in each period so that he had an equal 
probability of being grouped with each seller and each buyer in the session. Subject roles were 
fixed, however, so that once randomly assigned to a buyer or seller role in period 1, a subject 
always remained in this role.  
In each period the sequence of events was as follows. Sellers each chose a price between 
0 and 1000 francs by typing in a number on a field on their computer screen. After all sellers had 
chosen their prices, buyers’ computer screens displayed all of the prices submitted by the two or 
three sellers in their own group. Seller identities were never revealed. Buyers could then select 
any one of the sellers from whom to attempt to purchase or could elect not to make a purchase. 
They did not observe the choices of any other buyers at the time they made this decision. After 
all buyers made their choices, the screen of each subject in the group displayed the prices posted 
by each seller in their group, the number of buyers who chose each seller, the subject’s own 
earnings for the period, and the subject’s own accumulated earnings until the current point in the 
session. Subjects never observed buyer and seller identities, and subjects were randomly 
regrouped into new markets before the start of each new period. 
The values of parameters in the experiment were the following. In both treatments, vi = 
1000 “francs”, units of an experimental currency. The earnings for a seller were equal to the 
price he charged if he made a sale and zero if he did not make a sale. A buyer earned 1000 minus 
the price she paid if she purchased a unit and zero if she did not make a purchase. Francs were 
converted to US dollars in the calculation of subjects’ final earnings at a rate of 500 francs to $1 
for buyers and 1500 to $1 for sellers in the 2seller treatment. They were exchanged at 1500 to $1 
for buyers and 500 to $1 for sellers in the 3seller treatment. The differential conversion rates 
were private information and were selected due to the differences in equilibrium prices and 
surpluses in the two treatments. The sessions lasted about 75 minutes and subjects earned salient 
rewards of about $20 each on average. 
 
3b. Statistical Methodology 
As noted in the introduction, we chose to randomly regroup subjects each period in order to 
minimize the potential for collusion, since the theory the experiment tests is based on a static, 
one-shot game. Approximating a one-shot game also requires that a relatively large (by the 
standards of economic experiments) number of subjects be present at each session to lower the 10 
probability of repeated matching with the same group members. The cost of these design 
decisions is that it limits the number of statistically independent observations generated. 
Consequently, it is inappropriate to use simple statistical tests (e.g., t-tests or nonparametric 
tests) that require a large number of independent observations. Generating many independent 
observations for a market like this is not feasible for reasonable experimental research budgets. 
We can nevertheless draw statistical inferences by using panel data econometric methods that 
account for the dependence of observations and errors arising from repeated measures drawn on 
the same set of subjects. These include random effects models for the error term for subject-level 
analyses of price choices and buyer purchase decisions, and fixed effect models for session-level 
analyses of price variance or matching efficiency. 
Previous studies of experimental markets have revealed a general dynamic of early 
variability of prices with a pattern of convergence toward a stable attractor with repetition of the 
market process. Thus, to consider (a) whether markets converge to a theoretical model’s 
prediction and (b) which model’s predictions are closer to the price toward which the market 
data are converging, we require a statistical specification that allows for a convergence process. 
We use the specification (4), introduced by Noussair et al. (1995, 1997), which is frequently 
employed to study convergence in experimental markets (see for example Menkhaus et al., 2003; 
Elliot et al., 2003; Muller et al., 2002; or Riedl and Van Winden, 2001). The model assumes that 
the dependent variable exhibits a convergence pattern over time within each experimental 
session and approaches some value asymptotically: 
 
yit = β11D1(1/t) + β12D2(1/t) + β21D1((t-1)/t) + β22D2((t-1)/t) + uit,     (4) 
 
where i indexes the session, the Di dummy variables take on a value of 1 for the indicated session 
within each treatment, and t represents the market period. Notice that in the first period (t=1) the 
(t-1)/t terms are zero. Thus a β1i coefficient provides an estimate of the value of the dependent 
variable at the beginning of session i. As t→∞, the 1/t terms approach zero while the (t-1)/t terms 
approach one so the β2i coefficients indicate the asymptote of the dependent variable in session i. 
We include subject-specific random effects in the error term uit. 
This is clearly not a structural model, but is instead a reduced form approach used here as 
a metric to evaluate the absolute accuracy of the two models described in section 2. To do this 11 
we consider whether β2i is significantly different from the models’ predictions. If it is not 
different, we say that the variable in the session strongly converges to the model’s prediction. To 
consider whether the dependent variable is moving toward a predicted level in session i, we 
consider whether the β2i term is closer than the corresponding β1i term to the predicted level. If it 
is closer, we say that the dependent variable exhibits weak convergence toward the model’s 
prediction. To consider which of two models’ predictions is closer to the point to which the 
dependent variable in the session is converging, we compare the absolute differences between β2i 
and the prediction of each model, and the model whose prediction is closer to the estimated β2i is 
considered to be more accurate than the other. To consider whether the dependent variable 
converges to the same value in both sessions within a treatment, we test the restriction β2i = β2j 
for the two sessions, i and j in the treatment. 
 The specification in (4) is proposed ex-ante as a means of comparing the two models in a 
manner suitable for experimental market data. We recognize that the specification may have 
some inaccuracies as a complete characterization of the data, most likely because behavior 
exhibits some short-term dynamics from one period to the next. In section 4b and 4c, we report 
the results of ex-post data fitting exercises that shed some light on the relationship between 
outcomes in previous period and pricing and purchase decisions in subsequent periods. 
 
4. Results 
4a. Market behavior 
Prices: Figure 1 displays the time series of median posted prices and their standard deviations 
for each session. The standard deviation calculation uses each individual seller’s price offer 
during a period as the unit of observation. In the initial periods, prices are dispersed and near the 
middle range of feasible prices in three of the four sessions. These early prices tend to split the 
available exchange surplus more equally than the models predict. This may occur because 
fairness rather than strategic concerns dominate the early price choices, or because relatively 
equal surplus division is a behavioral property of the particular institution when it is first 
introduced to inexperienced subjects in our environment for other reasons. These figures clearly 
illustrate the importance of providing market feedback and experience. Within five to ten periods 
prices in the four sessions are moving away from the middle range toward the predictions of the 
BSW and Montgomery models. By period 10, however, prices in the 2seller treatment continue 12 
to increase so that they are moving away from both models’ predictions. In the 3seller treatment 
after period 10, prices are moving toward to the BSW prediction in one session and toward the 
Montgomery prediction in the other. Prices in the 2seller treatment converge to a level higher 
than the prediction of either model, though the level is closer to the BSW than the Montgomery 
prediction. In periods 39-48, the average posted price is 837. In the 3seller treatment the average 
posted price is 253 in periods 39-48, closer to the BSW prediction of 273 than the Montgomery 
prediction of 200. The pattern of prices is inconsistent with the Walrasian equilibrium in a 
market in which the matching friction exerts no effect, which implies a price of 1000 in the 
2seller treatment and 0 in the 3seller treatment. The variance of transaction prices generally 
declines over time. Thus, the prices are converging toward a common value. This last property is 
consistent with convergence of play toward a symmetric equilibrium (and with both the BSW 
and the Montgomery models), in which all trades occur at the same price.  
  
    [Figure 1: About Here] 
 
  
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of equation (4) as well as the results of  tests for 
a common asymptote β21 = β22 = β2 within each treatment. The estimates model the panel nature 
of the dataset with subject-specific random effects and correct for first-order autocorrelation. 
Because we are interested in the behavior that would be reached in a long-run steady state, we do 
not include in the analysis periods 49 and 50, in which endgame considerations potentially arise.
6 
The results shown in Table 2 provide statistical evidence consistent with the visual 
impression from Figure 1.
7 The F-test rejects the hypothesis of a common asymptote (β21 = β22) 
for both posted prices and transaction prices in the 3seller treatment at the p < .01 level, but not 
for the 2seller treatment where the difference between sessions is relatively minor. A comparison 
of the β2 terms with the predictions of the BSW and Montgomery models rejects the hypotheses 
                                                 
6 Not including the last periods of the time series to remove endgame effects in the analysis is a technique widely 
employed in experimental economics when subjects know which period ends the session. See for example Fouraker 
and Siegel (1963), Holt (1985), or Huck et al. (2001). Sellers in our experiment exhibit unusual but isolated 
endgame behavior in periods 49 and 50. In particular, in the 3seller treatment 2 out of 30 sellers post prices above 
500 in period 49, and 4 out of 30 sellers post prices above 500 in period 50; in the 2seller treatment 2 out of 18 
sellers post prices below 500 in period 50. 
7 Alternative specifications for the error term, such as assuming a common autocorrelation estimate across panels, 
provide similar conclusions. 13 
that posted and transaction prices are converging to the predicted levels under either model at the 
p < .05 level. All of the β2 terms are closer to the prediction of the BSW than the Montgomery 
model, however, and seven of eight β2i terms are closer to the BSW than the Montgomery 
prediction. Moreover, seven of the eight β2i terms are closer to the BSW prediction than the 
corresponding β1i terms, indicating weak convergence toward BSW predictions in most markets. 
To summarize:  
 
[Table 2: About Here] 
 
Result 1: The BSW model is a more accurate predictor of the prices towards which the markets 
converge than the Montgomery model. Average prices converge to values closer to the BSW 
prediction than the Montgomery prediction, with the exception of transaction prices for one of 
the sessions in the 3seller treatment. 
 
Price Dispersion: Figure 1 indicates that dispersion of prices tends to decline over time. The top 
half of Table 3 evaluates the hypothesis that price dispersion, defined as the variance of prices 
across all sellers within a session, approaches zero asymptotically under the same statistical 
models used in Table 2. In the estimation, the variance of posted prices is used as the dependent 
variable. The results are qualitatively similar when using alternative dispersion measures such as 
the standard deviation of prices or the range of prices (i.e., maximum – minimum posted price). 
Because variance is nonnegative, we use a Tobit model in the price dispersion regressions 
reported in Table 3.
8 The fact that all of the β2 and the β2i terms are closer to zero than the 
corresponding β1i terms indicates a clear decline in price variance over time within sessions. 
However, for three of the four sessions (the exception is one of the two 2seller sessions), price 
dispersion remains significantly positive even asymptotically. Comparison of the β2 and the β2i 
terms in the two different treatments indicates that price dispersion converges asymptotically to a 
higher level in 3seller than in 2seller (although comparing the β1 and the β1i terms suggests that 
the 3seller treatment is not necessarily characterized by more price dispersion early on in the 
                                                 
8 An ordinary least squares estimation of the same model yields very similar conclusions. For the 2seller treatment, 
only 38 of the 432 observations have a variance equal to the lower bound of zero, and OLS results provide no 
qualitative differences relative to the reported Tobit results. For the 3seller treatment, none of the 480 observations 
have a variance of zero (i.e., all 3 sellers in a particular market never posted the exact same price); therefore, the 
Tobit and OLS results are identical. 14 
sessions). An F-test of the restriction β21 = β22 is significant for both treatments (although only 
marginally in 3seller with p=0.057), indicating that price variance, though declining over time in 
all sessions, is heterogeneous between sessions of the same treatment. In summary: 
 
[Table 3: About Here] 
 
Result 2: Patterns of price dispersion are consistent with convergence towards common prices 
within sessions. Price dispersion (a) declines over time in all sessions; (b) converges to zero in 
one of the four sessions; and (c) converges to a higher level  in the 3seller treatment than in the 
2seller treatment. 
 
Price dispersion can be either a result of noisy or irrational behavior that is out of 
equilibrium, but it can also be evidence of the play of asymmetric equilibria, in which prices may 
differ among sellers and buyers visit different sellers with different probabilities. However, the 
decline in price dispersion over time suggests that the price dispersion may be more 
appropriately described as noise, which decreases as individuals accumulate more experience 
with the particular market interaction in the experiment, and that play is converging toward a 
symmetric equilibrium. To reach a symmetric equilibrium, all agents must adopt the same 
strategy, which they continue to use as they are regrouped with new individuals each period.  
However, to play an asymmetric equilibrium, individuals must use each strategy in the 
equilibrium strategy profile each period in the correct proportion. An individual would typically 
have to change strategy as if he were aware of the proportion of other players choosing each 
other strategy, an implausible calculation given our stranger matching protocol. 
 
The Matching Rate: Both models predict the same equilibrium quantity of trade because they 
both assume that each buyer visits each seller with equal probability. From equation (2), the 
expected number of sales in each 5-trader market is 1.67 in the 3seller treatment and 1.75 in the 
2seller treatment. Figure 2 displays the mean number of matches for the two treatments, shown 
as 10-period moving averages because of the substantial variation across periods. In the 3seller 
treatment the average number of matches observed per five-member group is 1.64. In the 2seller 
treatment the average number of matches per group is 1.65. The actual number of trades was thus 15 
close though on average slightly less than the predicted number, indicating no successful 
coordination on the part of buyers onto particular sellers. (Recall that groups were randomly 
reassigned each period, which makes coordination very difficult.)  
 
    [Figure 2: About Here] 
 
We can equivalently express the number of matches in terms of a “friction rate,” defined 
as the probability of only one rather than two trades. Both models predict that two trades occur 
with probabilities of 2/3 in the 3seller treatment and 3/4 in the 2seller treatment, which implies 
equilibrium friction rates of 1/3 in the 3seller treatment and 1/4 in the 2seller treatment.
9 The 
bottom half of Table 3 presents a set of probit models used to study the friction rates observed in 
the experiment. We test the hypotheses that β2 equals 0.675, which is equivalent to a probability 
of two matches occurring of ¾ for the 2seller treatment, and that β2 equals 0.43 for a predicted 
two-match rate of 2/3 in 3seller. These  β2 values are the levels of the standard normal CDF, used 
in the probit model, that correspond to these match rates. The data do not reject the predicted 
3seller match rate of 2/3, but they strongly reject the predicted 2seller match rate of 3/4. Traders 
in the 2seller treatment experience more frictions than predicted by the models. Indeed, the 
match rate in both treatments is similar to the 2/3 rate predicted for the 3seller treatment. If all of 
the match rate data are pooled, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the match rate is equal in the 
two treatments at the 5 percent level (p-value=0.937). Thus, while the data strongly support the 
comparative static predictions of the theoretical models with regard to prices, they are not 
consistent with the comparative static predictions for the friction rate. 
 
Result 3:  The friction rate is consistent with the predictions of both models in the 3seller 
treatment. However, traders experience more frictions than the models predict in the 2seller 
treatment. 
 
                                                 
9 These markets have at least one transaction unless all buyers in the same market simultaneously refuse to purchase 
in a particular period. In only a total of two instances out of the 2350 buyer purchase opportunities over the four 
sessions did a buyer choose not to attempt to purchase from any seller. Every single period had at least one 
transaction. 16 
Although our analysis of aggregate market behavior indicates that the BSW model is 
more consistent with the data than the Montgomery model, it identifies two major deviations 
from the BSW model’s predictions: (1) prices that exceed the predictions of the models in the 
2seller treatment; and (2) a friction rate that exceeds the model’s predictions in the 2seller 
treatment. The next two subsections investigate buyer and seller behavior in the 2seller treatment 
in greater detail to try to identify the source of these deviations. Our analysis is structured in 
relation to the BSW model since prices are more consistent with its predictions than with those 
of the Montgomery model. 
 
4b. Buyer Behavior 
We argue below that in the 2seller treatment, the average transaction prices in excess of the BSW 
prediction documented in the last subsection are accompanied by buyers’ purchase probabilities 
that are less sensitive to price differences than in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the subgame 
consisting of the buyers’ simultaneous choices of seller given current posted prices. More 
specifically, demand is less elastic than in the symmetric Nash equilibrium with respect to 
differences between the prices of the two sellers when seller price differences are large. Overall 
in the 2seller treatment, the seller charging the lower price makes 57.6 percent of all sales and 
the seller charging the higher price makes 42.4 percent of all sales. Although offer prices are 
equal in equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome emerges from the use of an optimal purchase rule 
on the part of buyers, and optimal price setting behavior on the part of sellers. The deviations 
from equilibrium outcomes that we observe in our data may merely reflect suboptimal behavior 
on the part of the seller side of the market. Buyers’ purchase behavior may still be optimal given 
the prices sellers have chosen, even though the prices differ from the model’s predictions and 
result in subgames off of the equilibrium path being reached. This possibility is not unreasonable 
given the relative simplicity of the buyer’s decision, which takes place after prices are known. 
The seller’s decision, in contrast, involves anticipating the prices of competing sellers and the 
purchase behavior of buyers.  
Consider the problem facing one of the three buyers in the 2seller treatment, who in the 
last stage of the game choose which seller to visit. Following BSW and normalizing the buyer 
value to 1, denote as θ the probability that the other two buyers attempt to purchase from seller 
A. The expected profit for this buyer when attempting to purchase at price pA from seller A is 17 
 
Eπbuyer(seller A) = (1- pA)[θ 
2/3 + θ (1-θ) + (1-θ)
2]       (5) 
 
and the expected profit when attempting to purchase at price pB from seller B is 
 
Eπbuyer(seller B) = (1- pB)[θ 
2 + θ (1-θ) + (1-θ)
2/3]       (6) 
 
For this buyer to adopt a mixed strategy of purchasing from a seller with a probability other than 
zero or one, the expected profits from visiting seller A and seller B must be equal. A little 
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If the difference in prices is great enough, then buyers do not play a mixed strategy and all three 
go to the lower-priced seller with probability one.
10  Of course, for pA = pB the critical θ* = 0.5.  
  Figure 3 illustrates how this critical probability 1-θ* varies for some different 
combinations of prices for the two sellers. These resulting equilibrium “demand curves” for 
seller B are decreasing in B’s price and shift up as seller A raises her price. Buyers in the 2seller 
treatment face equal prices in less than 9 percent of the periods, and in less than 3 percent of the 
periods the price difference is great enough that buyers would strictly prefer one seller and play 
the pure strategy of attempting to purchase from him with probability one. For the other 88 
percent of the periods, equation (7) describes the rate that buyers approach the low priced seller 
in the Nash equilibrium of the subgames resulting from the prices the sellers have posted. 
The equilibrium purchase probabilities derived above are those of a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium for the subgame consisting of buyers simultaneously choosing which seller to visit 
after observing sellers’ posted prices. These are equilibrium probabilities that hold independently 
of the rule that sellers use to choose their posted prices. Thus they are probabilities that are 
                                                 
10 This occurs, for example, when one seller posts a price of 0.4 and the other seller posts a price of 0.85. In this case 
a one-third chance of buying at a price of 0.4 (with a buyer value of 1) gives an expected payoff of 0.2, which 
exceeds the expected payoff of buying at 0.85 with certainty (which yields a payoff of 0.15). 18 
consistent with both the BSW and Montgomery models, although they are off the symmetric 
equilibrium path of both models.
11 
 
    [Figure  3:  About  Here] 
 
  These equilibrium purchase probabilities for the subgames actually played by buyers in 
the 2seller treatment are very close to the observed friction rates. The friction rate of 0.25 in the 
2seller treatment, which is predicted by both the BSW and Montgomery models, is a 
consequence of the sellers posting identical prices. In this case the three buyers would go to the 
two sellers with equal probability, so all three would approach the same seller (resulting in a 
friction) with probability (½)
3 + (1 - ½)
3 = 0.25. But any price dispersion changes the 
equilibrium  θ* for that particular subgame and raises the friction probability above 0.25. 
Calculation of the θ* for every combination of prices buyers actually faced in the 2seller 
treatment, results in a predicted friction rate of 0.36. This is almost exactly equal to the 0.35 
observed friction rate in the 2seller treatment.  
  Although the overall friction rate is consistent with optimal behavior on the part of buyers 
given actual prices, it appears to be largely due to the averaging of behavior over a large number 
of decisions. At the level of the individual observation, there are inconsistencies between the rate 
at which buyers approach the low-price seller and the rate equation (7) implies. Figure 4 presents 
a comparison between the observed rate that buyers approach the low priced seller and the rate at 
which buyers would be indifferent between the sellers (based on equation (7)) using all periods 
of the 2seller treatment. When seller prices are similar so that buyers exhibiting equilibrium 
behavior approach sellers with approximately equal probability (the lower left region of the 
figure), the data show that buyers tend to be overly responsive to price differences. For example, 
when equation (7) indicates that buyers approach the low-price seller with probability 0.55, we 
observe buyers approaching the low-price seller 62 percent of the time. However, when price 
                                                 
11 We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria of this subgame, as well as symmetric equilibria of the BSW model, 
because one feature of our design makes it much more difficult for individuals to reach an asymmetric equilibrium. 
This feature is the random regrouping of individuals each period. To reach a symmetric equilibrium, all agents must 
adopt the same strategy, and continue to use it they are regrouped with new individuals each period.  However, to 
play an asymmetric equilibrium the individuals who are grouped together each period must use each strategy in the 
equilibrium strategy profile in the correct proportion ex post. Thus, an individual will typically have to change 
strategy while somehow being aware of the proportion of other players choosing each other strategy. Previous 
research has indicated that coordination on asymmetric equilibria is difficult even in more simple games such as two 
by two bimatrix battle of the sexes games (e.g., Cooper et al., 1989). 19 
differences between sellers are relatively large and imply higher predicted rates of approaching 
the low-price seller, buyers tend to be underresponsive to price differences. For example, when 
equation (7) indicates that buyers approach the low-price seller with probability 0.86, we observe 
buyers approaching the low-price seller only 69 percent of the time.
12 Thus, a buyer’s decision to 
attempt to purchase from the low-priced seller is less dependent on the magnitude of the price 
difference between the two sellers than in the Nash equilibrium of the purchase subgame. 
 
    [Figure  4:  About  Here] 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of two behavioral models of the buyer decision regarding 
whether or not to approach the low-price seller in a particular period. The dependent variables in 
these probit models equal one when the individual buyer approaches the seller with the lowest 
price. The independent variables include the predicted probability under optimal behavior given 
the prices, and a dummy variable that equals one if the buyer approached the low-priced seller in 
the immediately preceding period. Other variables in the regression are: whether or not the 
previous attempt to purchase from the low-priced seller was successful or not, the number of 
other buyers attempting to purchase from the low-priced seller in the preceding period, and the 
total number of periods in the session until the current point. We exclude the 9 percent of the 
periods in which buyers face equal prices. As with the seller results presented above, we estimate 
the model with a random subject effects error specification. This properly adjusts the variance 
estimates to account for the multiple observations on individual buyers.  
The results in columns (1) and (2) for the 2seller treatment indicate that an increase in the 
equilibrium probability of approaching the low-price seller (θ) is strongly associated with a 
greater likelihood of actually approaching the low-price seller. But the estimates indicate also 
that buyers are less responsive to the price differences than the reaction function specifies. In 
particular, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables, the marginal impact of an 
increase in θ is about 0.613 for both models shown in columns (1) and (2), which is significantly 
less than one, the predicted value. The other significant regressor in columns (1) and (2) is the 
number of other buyers who approached the low-price seller in the previous period. If more 
buyers approach the low-price seller, it raises the probability that a buyer would experience a 
                                                 
12 Over two-thirds (69%) of the observed price differences imply probabilities of approaching the low-price seller of 
0.66 or lower. 20 
friction when approaching the low-price seller. The negative coefficient estimate on this term 
suggests that buyers react toward the experience of observing a potential friction by reducing the 
rate that they also approach the low-price seller in the next period. Result 4 summarizes our 
findings on buyer behavior for the 2seller treatment: 
 
[Table 4: About Here] 
 
Result 4: In the 2seller treatment, the friction rate is consistent with Nash equilibrium buyer 
behavior in the subgames reached after sellers post prices. The two main discrepancies between 
observed buyer behavior and model predictions are that (1) buyers are insufficiently sensitive to 
the differences between seller prices, exhibiting demand less elastic than predicted if buyers use 
best responses, and (2) buyers respond to the activity in the preceding period when making a 
choice of seller. 
 
  Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 provide evidence, in contrast, that the buyers in the 
3seller treatment are appropriately sensitive to the price differences and approach the low-price 
seller at approximately the optimal rate. The equilibrium probability of approaching the low-
price seller (θ) strongly predicts the observed probability of approaching the low-price seller, and 
buyers’ responsiveness to seller price differences. Evaluated at the means of the explanatory 
variables, the marginal impact of an increase in θ is about 1.17 for both models shown in 
columns (3) and (4), which is not significantly different from one. That is, a predicted increase in 
the probability of approaching the low-price seller is matched with a statistically similar increase 
in these models’ estimated probability of approaching the low-price seller. The other significant 
explanatory variables in columns (3) and (4) indicate that the buyer’s experience in the previous 
period is a source of deviations from the model’s predictions at the individual level. In particular, 
a buyer tends to increase his probability of approaching the low-price seller if he succeeded in 
purchasing from the low-price seller in the previous period or if the other buyer in his market did 
not approach the low-price seller in the previous period. 
 21 
Result 5: Buyers in the 3seller treatment respond to differences in seller prices in a manner 
consistent with equilibrium behavior. The main exception is that there is some tendency to also 
respond to the outcomes experienced in the previous period. 
 
4c.  Seller Behavior 
A natural question to ask is whether the buyer deviations from the equilibrium purchase 
probabilities are sufficient to cause best-responding sellers to price above the BSW prediction in 
the 2seller treatment. The direction of the deviations in sellers’ posted prices from equilibrium 
appears intuitive, since inelastic demand in the 2seller treatment permits sellers to profitably 
raise prices above the equilibrium. But do the buyers deviate from an optimal purchase rule 
enough to make the observed price choices optimal for the sellers? 
We conduct the following numerical calculations to address this question. We first 
summarize the buyer purchase decisions indicated on Figure 4 using a weighted linear OLS 
regression. Each observation is weighted by the number of price combinations that are consistent 
with the indicated probability. The predicted probabilities near 1/m receive more weight in the 
regressions because there are more price combinations that lead to nearly equal probabilities. We 
then determine the sellers’ best response to this (smoothed) observed buyer acceptance behavior, 
taking into account the sellers’ strategic interaction. 
The results suggest that this exercise yields at least a partial explanation of the price 
deviations from the BSW model. In the 2seller treatment, the best response to the observed buyer 
behavior is to post a price of 791. As expected, this exceeds the BSW model prediction of 727, 
and it is closer to the low 800s price range that sellers choose in the later periods of this 
treatment (Figure 1). Similar calculations for the 3seller treatment indicate that the sellers’ best 
response is to post prices of 256. This is only slightly below the BSW model prediction of 273, 
and it is also within the observed range for late period average prices in this treatment.
13 This is 
summarized as Result 6. 
 
Result 6: In the 2seller treatment, the above-equilibrium prices chosen by sellers are consistent 
with best response behavior to buyers’ purchase decisions. 
                                                 
13 The sellers’ best responses of 791 and 256 in the 2seller and 3seller treatments respectively are close to the 
estimated asymptotes of posted prices as t → ∞ of 802 and 285 reported in Table 2. This suggests that with 
experience observing buyer behavior, sellers are making better decisions over time. 22 
 
The behavioral models in Table 4 estimated for buyers suggest some dynamics from 
period to period that might conceivably lead to deviations of prices from equilibrium. Table 4 
indicates that buyers respond along the lines of simple reinforcement and belief learning rules to 
the level of risk of frictions in the previous period. In particular, some buyers apparently respond 
to the increased probability of a friction on the low-priced seller (i.e., more buyers approaching 
the low-price seller in the previous period) by going to a higher priced seller in the next period. 
We consider here whether changes in seller behavior also occur in response to previous market 
activity.  
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of a model of the sellers’ decision to change 
prices. The independent variables are whether the seller sold a unit in the previous period, the 
average of the competing sellers’ prices over the previous five periods, and whether a friction 
occurred in the previous period. The dependent variable is the change in price between the 
preceding and the current period. The models are estimated separately for the 2seller and 3seller 
treatments, and the estimates are corrected for the significant negative autocorrelation in the 
price changes. The error term is also specified with random subject effects.  
In both treatments, a seller charges a higher price if he sold a unit in the previous period 
than if he did not. When a seller has failed to make a sale, he adapts on average by charging a 
lower price in the next period than he would had he succeeded in making a sale. As in the case of 
buyer behavior, the results suggest an adaptive response to the outcomes of previous periods. 
While the coefficient on the friction indicator for the previous period is positive, as might be 
expected, it is neither statistically significant nor large in size. The estimates in the table also 
show that despite the fact that prices are strategic complements, the effect of the other sellers’ 
price in the previous five periods is negative in the 2seller treatment and insignificant in the 
3seller treatment.
14 This means that in the 2seller treatment, if overall market prices are relatively 
low, an individual is more likely to raise his price in the next period. The inelasticity of demand 
with respect to the price differences between sellers in the 2seller treatment suggests that such 
                                                 
14 We obtain similar results using the other sellers’ prices in the most recent previous period instead of the average 
over the previous five periods. Table 5 reports estimates based on the longer time frame of five periods because 
groups are randomly re-matched each period. Only looking back at one period might not provide the seller with a 
very accurate estimate of other sellers’ previous prices, and it would seem that the typical seller would use a longer 
horizon to determine his pricing decision. 23 
price increases are likely to be profitable. In the 3seller treatment, no significant price change in 
response to others’ prices was observed.  
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5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we report an experiment that studies a basic type of market friction. If a 
buyer cannot observe which seller that other buyers intend to purchase from, a coordination 
failure can arise in which, even if all prices are at an equilibrium level, there may be excess 
demand at one seller’s location and excess supply at another seller’s location. This type of 
friction is elegantly modeled by BSW (2001) and Montgomery (1991), using alternative 
assumptions on the nature of competition. Our experimental design allowed us to evaluate some 
of the predictions of each model. The main question we considered is which of the models 
described market outcomes more accurately. 
We find that frictions have an effect in our markets, as they do in the theoretical models 
we have considered. The Walrasian prices, which are 0 in the 3seller treatment and 1000 in the 
2seller treatment when agents can coordinate to overcome the friction, are not close to the prices 
we observe. Thus, we find that the matching friction is important even with a small number of 
buyers and sellers, so the BSW and Montgomery models are more relevant for the type of market 
we study here than frictionless models. Coordination is difficult here, and the friction appears to 
be permanent in nature, as it does not decline even when the game is repeated many times. 
It is perhaps surprising that the data are even remotely consistent with either of the two 
models, because of their highly stylized nature. However, we find that although there is some 
heterogeneity between sessions, the BSW model characterizes the data in an average sense more 
accurately than the Montgomery model. Behavior in the 3seller treatment is quite consistent with 
the BSW model. However, in the 2seller treatment, substituting subject behavior for model 
assumptions leads to two principal departures from the BSW model’s predictions. The first is 
that average prices exceed the predictions of the BSW model, and the second is that market 
frictions are more frequent than predicted when there are two sellers. These effects are not 24 
observed in the 3seller treatment, for which the BSW model predicts average prices and trading 
patterns very well.  
  Also, and perhaps not surprisingly, convergence to a common price for all sellers is not 
complete. We show that this small heterogeneity in prices can provide an explanation for the 
higher friction rate relative to the equilibrium rate in the 2seller treatment. Buyers’ are also less 
sensitive to price differences in this treatment than the model’s prediction and do not approach 
the low-price seller with sufficient frequency. Consequently, buyer “demand” (in terms of the 
revealed willingness to pay rather than in terms of the underlying incentive structure) in the 
2seller treatment is less elastic in the price differences between sellers than in equilibrium. In 
perhaps serendipitous recognition of this phenomenon, the sellers in the 2seller treatment behave 
as if they are aware of the inelasticity of demand and post prices above the BSW  levels. Future 
research could evaluate this interpretation by using robot buyers employing arbitrary demand 
behavior and considering whether sellers’ posted prices converge to the optimum conditional on 
buyers’ decisions. 
The cause of the inelasticity of demand in the 2seller treatment remains unexplained. 
However, the fact that this pattern is observed when there are two sellers and three buyers, but 
not when there are three buyers and two sellers, helps to narrow down the possible explanations. 
One possibility is the presence of tacit collusion, which would be more feasible for two sellers 
than for three.
15 Another possible explanation would be the presence of risk aversion. Risk 
aversion on the part of buyers would lead them to accept smaller amounts of surplus and thus 
encourage sellers to price higher than under risk neutrality. It is possible that the effect may be 
greater in the 2seller treatment, because of the higher probability that risk averse buyers fail to 
make a purchase and receive a payoff of zero, but it would appear that such an effect would 
depend on the functional form of the risk-averse utility function. On the other hand, if sellers are 
risk averse they would price lower than under risk neutrality. Therefore, if all individuals in the 
market were identically risk-averse, it is unclear what the net effect on prices would be. 
However, we believe that the explanation has more to do with the nature of competition 
on the part of buyers. Under the 3seller treatment, three units are to be sold to two buyers and in 
equilibrium there is an 83.3 percent chance that an individual buyer will be successful in making 
a purchase in a given period in equilibrium. In contrast, in the 2seller treatment, where there are 
                                                 
15 Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) also observe prices consistent with tacit collusion for duopolies but not triopolies 
in a random-matching design. Their markets did not feature frictions. 25 
three competing buyers, an individual buyer has only a 58.3 percent equilibrium probability of 
making a purchase. If buyers perceive missing out on a profitable trade as strong and salient 
negative feedback, the greater probability of not obtaining a unit in the 2seller treatment may 
induce a greater degree of competition and price taking behavior on the part of buyers. This in 
turn can lead to prices closer to the buyers’ true willingness-to-pay of 1000 than would occur in 
the BSW model, in which buyers are strategic.
16  
                                                 
16 This pattern has a close analogy in experimental research on auctions. When multiple units are sold to buyers who 
are each permitted to purchase one unit, the relative number of potential buyers and units available is a key 
determinant of whether prices are higher or lower than Nash equilibrium levels. When the number of bidders is 
relatively high compared to the number of units sold, prices are more likely to be higher than in equilibrium (see 
Cox et al., 1984). Behavior consistent with “zero profit aversion” is also observed in discriminative auctions with 
multi-unit demand, in which buyers submit a high price, low-profit “secure” bid on one unit and a low price, high-
profit bid on the other unit (Engelmann and Grimm, 2004). 26 
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Instructions for Experiment 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn 
a considerable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is francs. All trading will 
be in terms of francs. Your francs will be converted to dollars at a rate of _________ francs to 
one dollar. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
The experiment is divided into a series of 50 periods. After the 50
th period the experiment will 
end. Participants will have the role of either a buyer or a seller. The sellers will each have a 
single unit of a product to sell in each period. Buyers can make money every period that they are 
able to purchase a unit of the product. Each period, each participant will be assigned to a group at 
random. In other words, the computer will randomly select the other members of your group 
each period, so the other participants in your group will typically change each period. Each 
group will consist of 2 sellers and 3 buyers. However, you will remain a ___________ for the 
entire experiment. There are 25 participants in today’s experiment, so there are 5 groups, with 5 
randomly-changing participants in each group. 
 
Specific Instructions for Sellers 
 
During each period you will have a unit of the product to sell. Your earnings for the period will 
equal the price at which you sell your unit. If you do not sell your unit your earnings are zero for 
the period.  
 
To sell your product, enter a price in the box labeled Your offer on your computer screen. Then 
select the [Make Offer] button. The price you enter must be a whole number and cannot be more 
than 1000 or less than 0. You will not be able to observe the other sellers’ prices until you make 
your own choice. 
 
The buyers will then choose a seller to purchase from. If you are not chosen by any buyer, you 
do not make a sale for the period. If you are chosen by one or more buyers, you sell one unit for 
the period. At the end of the period, your computer screen will indicate the number of buyers 
who tried to buy from you, whether or not you sold your unit, your earnings for the period, and 
your total earnings so far for the experimental session. It will also show the prices offered by the 
other sellers in your group and the number of buyers that attempted to purchase from them. You 
will need to record some of this information on your Personal Record Sheet. 
 
Specific Instructions for Buyers 
 
During each period you have the opportunity to try to purchase one unit of the product. If you 
purchase a unit, your earnings will equal 1000 minus the price you paid for the unit. For 30 
example, if you purchase a unit at a price of 834, your earnings are 1000 – 834 = 166. If you do 
not purchase a unit, your earnings are zero for the period.  
 
After all sellers have submitted their prices, the prices will be displayed to all buyers in your 
group. At this point, you may try to purchase a unit. To try to purchase a unit, use your computer 
screen and select one of the options in response to the question “What is your choice?” The 
options available to you are to purchase from any one of the sellers or not to purchase at all. 
After you have made a choice select the [OK] button. 
 
If you are the only buyer to have chosen a particular seller, you definitely make a purchase from 
that seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, each buyer has an equal chance of 
being able to purchase from that seller. For example, if you and one other buyer select seller Z, 
each of you has a 50% chance of being able to purchase a unit from her. The buyer who does not 
purchase a unit receives zero earnings for the period. The buyer who succeeds in purchasing is 
determined randomly, and is not based on how fast buyers choose a seller. 
 
After all buyers have made their choices, the period ends. The upper half of your screen will then 
display the following information: the seller you chose (if any), the price she offered, the number 
of buyers who attempted to purchase from her, whether or not you made a purchase and your 
earnings for the period and for the experiment so far. The lower half of you screen will indicate 
the prices offered by all other sellers in your group and the number of buyers who attempted to 
purchase from each seller. You will need to record some of this information on your Personal 
Record Sheet.   31
Personal Record Sheet for Buyer _________ 
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Personal Record Sheet for Seller _________ 
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Divide total earnings by conversion rate: ÷    
 
    Total earnings in dollars: $     
   33
 
Table 1: The Experimental Sessions 
Session Date 
Conducted 
n m Number of 
Participants 
PB P M 
2seller-1 4/16/02  3  2  20  727  571 
2seller-2 4/17/02  3  2  25  727  571 
3seller-1 4/10/02  2  3  25  273  200 
3seller-2 4/24/02  2  3  25  273  200 
   34
Table 2: Convergence Patterns over Time of Posted Prices and Transaction Prices 
yit = β11D1(1/t) + β12D2(1/t) + β21D1((t-1)/t) + β22D2((t-1)/t) + uit 





























Posted Prices                     








  727 571  β21 = β22 
(p=0.097) 
  864 




  801.66 
(7.01) 
727 571  β2 = 727 
(p<0.01) 
β2 = 571 
(p<0.01) 
864 








  273 200  β21 = β22 
(p<0.01) 
  1440 




  284.55 
(5.45) 
273 200  β2 = 273 
(p=0.034) 
β2 = 200 
(p<0.01) 
1440 
Transaction Prices                     








  727 571  β21 = β22 
(p=0.089) 
  717 




  796.13 
(9.24) 
727 571  β2 = 727 
(p<0.01) 
β2 = 571 
(p<0.01) 
717 








  273 200  β21 = β22 
(p<0.01) 
  784 




  246.10 
(4.48) 
273 200  β2 = 273 
(p <0.01) 
β2 = 200 
(p<0.01) 
784 
Notes: Standard errors or hypothesis test p-values shown in parentheses. All models are estimated with random subject (seller) 
specific autocorrelation coefficients and with standard errors corrected for possible contemporaneous correlation across seller panels 
(Prais-Winsten regression). All models drop the final two periods 49-50.   35
Table 3: Convergence Patterns over Time of Posted Price Variance and the Matching Rate 
yit = β11D1(1/t) + β12D2(1/t) + β21D1((t-1)/t) + β22D2((t-1)/t) + uit 











Posted Price Variance (Tobit Model)               








  0 0  β21 = β22 
(p=0.029) 
432 




  951 
(477) 
0 0  β2 = 0 
(p=0.047) 
432 








  0 0  β21 = β22 
(p=0.057) 
480 




  3577 
(766) 
0 0  β2 = 0 
(p<0.01) 
480 
Probability of Two Matches (Probit Model)               








  0.675 0.675  β21 = β22 
(p=0.687) 
432 




  0.407 
(0.072) 
0.675 0.675  β2 = 0.675 
(p<0.01) 
432 








  0.43 0.43  β21 = β22 
(p=0.037) 
480 




  0.415 
(0.068) 




Notes: Standard errors or hypothesis test p-values shown in parentheses. All models drop the final two periods 49-50.   36
Table 4: Random Effects Probit Models of Buyer i’s Decision to Approach Low-Price Seller 
Dependent Variable: Probability that Buyer Approached Low-Priced Seller (Marginal Effects 
Shown, Evaluated at Means of the Explanatory Variables) 
 
                         2seller                             3seller        . 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probability of Approaching Low-
Price Seller (θ) under BSW model 









i D1=1 if Buyer i Approached the 




  0.188** 
(0.047) 
 
i D2=1 iff Buyer i Succeeded in 
Buying from the Low-Price Seller 
Last Period,  
=0 otherwise 
  -0.004 
(0.035) 
  0.231** 
(0.080) 
i D3=1 iff Buyer i Failed when 
Trying to Buy from the Low-Price 
Seller Last Period 
= 0 otherwise 
  -0.026 
(0.028) 
  0.075 
(0.072) 
Number of Other Buyers who 


























Observations 1206  1206  786  786 
Log-likelihood  -726.1 -725.9 -397.2 -394.9 
Restricted (slopes=1) Log-
likelihood 
-802.2 -802.2 -544.4 -544.4 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significantly different from zero at 5-percent 
level; ** denotes significantly different from zero at 1-percent level.   37





t P P 1 − − , Change in Seller i’s Price from period t-1 to period t 
 
Variable 2seller  3seller 












Indicator=1 iff a Friction (i.e., total units sold<2) 









Observations 774  1260 
R
2 0.135  0.04 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significantly different from zero at 5-percent 
level; ** denotes significantly different from zero at 1-percent level. 
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Median Posted 2seller-1 Mean + 1 Std. Error Mean - 1 Std. Error
Median Posted 2seller-2 Mean + 1 Std. Error Mean - 1 Std. Error
Median Posted 3seller-1 Mean + 1 Std. Error Mean - 1 Std. Error
Median Posted 3seller-2 Mean + 1 Std. Error Mean - 1 Std. Error
Burdett et al. Prediction Montgomery Prediction
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2seller Treatment 10-Period Moving Average
Equilibrium Prediction--2sellers
3seller Treatment 10-Period Moving Average
Equilibrium Prediction--3sellers
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Price of A = 650
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Weighted OLS best fit
 